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The role of the state in developing countries raises a number of questions that are of 
particular interest in terms of economic development. What are the functions of the 
state in developing countries in accelerating economic development? Why do states 
perform differently in this respect? My work on the state provides some tentative 
answers to these questions (and these are very different answers from some answers 
to similar questions provided by Chibber, Harriss-White and others in this series). It 
also raises many more questions for further research.  
 
Observations of the role of the state in developing countries suggests that i) there are 
many trajectories of capitalist development. All developing countries have capitalist 
sectors characterized by private ownership, production for the market, the 
employment of wage labour. But equally, the capitalist sector does not dominate in 
developing countries, and the growth of the capitalist sector varies enormously. 
Performance ranges from high-growth state-led capitalist transformations as in the 
North East Asian countries to intermediate cases of moderate growth as in Thailand 
and now in South Asian countries like India and Bangladesh, to very low growth or 
collapse in some countries. The role of the state is obviously different in these 
different types of trajectories, and too much of the developmental state debate is 
conducted on the assumption that the North East Asian model is the only one 
available.  
 
ii) States have very different political constituencies and follow different strategies. 
The state strategies and governance structures that work are not a simple policy 
variable as some readings of the new work on the state suggests. It is not the case that 
if India, say, adopted South Korean state policies in full, including say export 
orientation (as Chibber suggested) that the results would be anything like South 
Korea. This is because institutions are only as good as their effective management and 
enforcement and these in turn depend on the underlying social organization and power 
structures. Ignoring these can result in poor analysis and bad policy. 
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 iii) But this does not mean that state policies are determined by social structure. The 
same social and class structure can support many different patterns of factional 
organization and state policies, and class structures are themselves changing over 
time. The task of analysis is to ask if specific state structures and policies are the most 
conducive for economic development in that social context. Such an analysis cannot 
but be political because the analysis of the implications of factional analysis is central 
to an analysis of the economy.  
 
To understand the state better, I propose to look at 3 interdependent areas of analysis 
that need to be developed and integrated to provide the analytical framework for a 
proper analysis of the state.  
 
Before we begin, I define the state as the set of institutions that protect, transform, and 
enforce rights, both over assets and over politically generated income flows (that are 
also known in the modern literature as rents). These institutions are not necessarily 
under the control of any class but the factions that control the state do respond to class 
and factional mobilizations in their own self-interest both in order to maintain 
political stability and to accelerate the state’s own access to economic surplus.  
 
The three areas that I want to focus on are as follows:  
1) the intense instability of property rights and rents in the context of transformation, 
and the debates over the analysis of this instability. 
2) the institutions of compulsion required for rapid productivity growth in developing 
countries and their role in catching up. 
And 3) the role of political power in explaining institutional performance and the 
categories appropriate for the analysis of power in developing countries. 
 
We will deal with these three areas in turn. 
 
1) The first major area of my analytical contribution is to analyze the implications of 
property right instability, rents and transfers in developing countries. By any measure 
of property right instability, or expropriation risk, rights in developing countries are 
contested to a significantly greater extent than in advanced countries. Rents on the 
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other hand, are ubiquitous in both, rents defined in the modern sense of politically 
created incomes rather than in the classical Ricardian sense. But in developing 
countries, a greater proportion of rents take the form of illegal transfers and 
expropriations. The economics of this period of property right instability and 
illegitimate rents is very contentious and its adequate analysis goes beyond both 
neoclassical economics but also classical political economy with its emphasis on 
value theory and the capitalist mode of production.  
 
The emerging consensus in mainstream policy circles is that the property right 
instability is itself the source of the problem in developing countries. The good 
governance agenda is about how to reduce this property right instability and 
expropriation risk. The mechanisms are reforms of the legal and political system of 
developing countries, anti-corruption drives, and policy reforms that reduce the 
amount of rents that developing country states can generate. The intellectual origins 
of this approach go back to New Institutional Economics and the new political 
economy. These methodologies identified the importance of lowering transaction 
costs and stabilizing property rights for efficient markets to emerge.  
 
However, these approaches are based on a misunderstanding of the implications of the 
New Institutional Economics framework itself, as well as of the economics of 
catching up.  
 
One of the few significant contributions of the New Institutional Economics was 
actually to point out that the transaction cost sector in advanced countries like the US 
amounted to as much as half of the economy. The point is that efficient market 
exchanges require low transaction costs at the point of exchange, but this requires the 
socialization of transaction costs, not their elimination, which is impossible. The more 
sophisticated transaction cost theorists in fact point out that the zero transaction cost 
neoclassical model is a useless benchmark for analysis. From this perspective, if you 
ask why private transaction costs are high in developing countries, the answer is 
obvious. The existing use of assets is such that they do not produce enough surplus to 
pay for a public enforcement of property rights that could lower the transaction cost at 
the point of production and exchange.  
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So we have a chicken and egg problem. Do we first have to reduce transaction costs 
so that an efficient market economy can emerge or does social productivity have to 
increase so that a surplus is available for property right enforcement that can then 
make the market economy even more efficient in conventional terms? The first option 
is simply implausible unless a surplus is available externally and the historical 
evidence, contested though it is, suggests that the second is the route that capitalist 
developers actually followed.  
 
From this perspective alone, the good governance agenda is doomed. But this leaves 
us with a critical question: why does the non-market transfer of assets that is the result 
of high market transaction costs lead to the emergence of a dynamic capitalist 
economy in a few cases, and social and economic collapse in others? There is a 
massive literature here that I do not propose to summarize.  
 
First, there is the consensus good governance opinion that is backed up by a very 
dubious use of cross-sectional regression analysis. This has been recently backed up 
with an equally dubious historical analysis based on proxy variables such as that by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson. These statistical exercises systematically ignore 
the experience of catching-up countries that drop out as outliers, a problem that I have 
pointed out in my work on state failure.  
 
Secondly, there are intelligent developments of this analysis that look at possible 
factors that could explain the lack of fit between the theory and evidence. Prominent 
amongst these is the work of Danny Rodrik and his group who argue that while stable 
property rights and low expropriation risk are indeed required for rapid development, 
the way they are achieved in developing countries may sometimes give the impression 
that they have not been achieved. This is because Rodrik rightly points out that the 
enforcement of rights depends on the underlying political conditions of countries, and 
the political realities of developing countries may mean that developing countries 
often enforce property rights through unconventional methods such as using local 
power networks. I think on this Rodrik is essentially right (and my own work on 
patron-client networks is in this vein) but he does not go far enough.  
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This is because Rodrik is working within the market paradigm of development, where 
development is accelerated if the market is more efficient. Market efficiency in turn 
requires across-the-board property right stability that is measured by low transaction 
costs. In fact, if we look at the context of asset non-viability that characterizes 
development, the problem is that across-the-board reductions in transaction costs are 
not feasible by definition. Even if they were magically possible, they would not solve 
the problem because if there are significant differences in productivity between 
current and future uses of an asset, market transactions become subject to hold-ups 
and high transaction costs that have nothing to do with enforcement. This is why 
when we look even at the most dynamic developing countries; we find that it is not 
the case that property rights across the board have been stabilized through 
unconventional means. Rather, what we find is that some property rights have been 
stabilized through unconventional means (namely the rights of the emerging 
capitalists) while other groups have very weakly defined rights and indeed rapidly 
lose their assets to emerging capitalists. In other words, by looking at TVEs in China, 
and the way they have stabilized their rights, Rodrik ignores how the power structure 
in China actually allows peasants, workers and municipalities to be deprived of their 
rights without much opportunity for resistance. This aspect of the Chinese story is just 
as important for explaining China’s staggering success in its transformation and 
important to remember if we are to avoid the mistake of believing that China has 
mysteriously achieved property right stability for everyone through some 
unconventional methods.  
 
So we have a materialist explanation of property right instability in developing 
countries, and the question then is to explain the directions in which asset ownership 
and control evolve given that there will be losers and winners in the non-market 
processes through which assets are re-allocated during this period. These types of 
observations lead us in the direction of Brenner and Wood type of analysis of the 
organization of power and conflict that drives primitive accumulation in particular 
directions in different contexts, and I think any analysis of the state has to have this 
kind of class analysis as one of its core components. I will have some more to say on 
this later. Parenthetically, we should note that while Marx was way ahead of his time 
in recognizing the importance of the expenditures on maintaining property rights he 
did not provide any analysis of how to assess the degree of waste implied in different 
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structures of transaction costs. In Capital, he simply wrote off all expenditures that 
protected property rights as unproductive (and these included not just policing and 
legal sectors, but also finance and trade). Baran and Sweezy’s work on the waste of 
monopoly capitalism in advertising and military expenditures was an extension of this 
tradition. In a sense, Marx is saying that a significant part of the activities of advanced 
capitalist countries consists of transaction cost activities, but this does not help us to 
assess to what extent they are avoidable. Baran and Sweezy argued that much of this 
was avoidable, but their counterfactual was a notional socialist economy.  
 
2) The second area in which the conventional understanding of the role of the state in 
developing countries fails is in the economic analysis of catching up. The mainstream 
analysis can best be understood using Wood’s distinction between markets as systems 
of opportunities versus markets as systems of compulsion. In early capitalism, the 
achievement of capitalist property right structures together with market competition 
was sufficient to create compulsions for rapid productivity growth in the way 
analysed by Marx in Capital. In late capitalist development, capitalist property rights 
and the market do not maximize technological progress without further institutional 
conditions. Part of the reason for this has been identified in the developmental state 
literature as the problem of learning. Rents have to be created to accelerate 
technological progress, with the associated problem of managing these rents. Here is 
the problem identified by Amsden, Chibber, Chang and myself, with different 
answers about the conditions that are required for the effective management of these 
rents.  
 
The early literature on the capacity of the state to discipline, coming from Amsden, 
Chang and others stressed the strength of the state, its insulation from society, the 
vision of its leaders, and other characteristics internal to the institutional structure of 
the state in defining its developmental capacity. While there are clearly minimal 
institutional conditions required of the state, subsequent comparative work showed 
that there were many institutional similarities between some of the countries that did 
well and others that did not. This evidence inspired Chibber to focus on the capacity 
of capitalists in India to avoid discipline. I do not find his emphasis on the difference 
between economic policies of export promotion versus import substitution very 
convincing. Nevertheless, I agree that the answer to the differences in the disciplining 
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outcomes have to be sought not just in the internal organization of the state but also in 
the state-society relationship that allows or prevents the effective disciplining of a 
range of critical rents, of which learning rents are an important variant. 
 
In my work I focus on the interdependence of rents of different types that factions 
organize to capture in developing countries and the implications of different factional 
organizations for the management of different patterns of rents. To proceed with this 
analysis, I need to say something about factions and patron-client networks.  
 
3) While I think class must be the starting point for an analysis of social organization, 
it is obvious that in most developing countries classes are not actors in the sense of 
being classes for themselves. The good governance analysis points out the prevalence 
of patron-client networks in developing country states but explains this using a neo-
Weberian analysis of neo-patrimonialism. This argument suggests that the state is 
penetrated by factions and economic interests because of an insufficient separation of 
the private from the public, an insufficient development of democracy and an 
insufficient formalization of procedures. Ultimately, the neo-Weberian analysis 
appeals to cultural explanations of different traditions of state formation. The 
widespread manifestation of corruption and personalized rule in developing countries 
is then explained in these terms.  
 
However, I argue that there are powerful materialist reasons for the persistence of 
patron-client politics in developing countries. This explains why this type of state-
society relationship dominates in a vast variety of developing countries irrespective of 
cultural and policy contexts. It also explains why patron-client networks and 
patrimonial styles of politics can be identified in virtually all developing countries, 
irrespective of economic performance. The property right instability and 
transformation that we began with has a lot to do with the persistence of this type of 
political organization.  
 
a) when property rights and other rights are contested and weakly defined, an 
important source of accumulation is through the exercise of political power. Groups 
that can organize a more strident exercise of power are likely to capture more.  
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b) the organization of political power is not likely to take place along class lines 
because classes can only be players when credible class strategies of transformation 
can be presented. If the accumulation strategy is the capture of specific resources, 
assets or subsidies, class action is less likely. Nevertheless, the organization of 
patron-client networks, depends critically on the underlying class structure. The latter 
determines the class origin of leaders and followers within these factions, the 
strategies they are likely to follow, how fragmented or consolidated they are and so 
on. Thus, to identify the structure of these networks, which I think is critical for 
subsequent analysis, we need to begin with class analysis of a society, but class 
analysis alone will not tell us all that we need to know about the organization of 
political power in developing countries. 
c) the organization of patron-client factions is particularly suited for these types of 
political accumulation strategies. Faction leaders want to maximize organizational 
power at the least cost. They therefore seek members of lower social status than 
themselves who can be purchased at a lower cost. Pyramids rapidly build up and they 
are also unstable as factions keep realigning as subfactions recalculate the payoffs 
they are likely to get by belonging to insider or outsider factions.  
d) there are also materialist reasons why the exercise of power by patron-client 
networks is usually extra-legal and not formalized. Most of the assets and rights that 
factions organize to capture (though definitely not all) are not legitimate market 
transfers. Even the transfer rents that groups organize to capture are typically not 
fiscal resources but off-budget transfers. This is simply because the fiscal resources 
do not exist in most developing countries for legal budgetary transfers. Political 
stabilization requires off-budget transfers to the most troublesome factions and their 
inclusion in the coalitions operating the state.  
 
While the factions controlling the state are therefore typically not capitalist, it is 
possible to see why out of self-interest ruling factions may support the growth of 
capitalist sectors and indeed use state power to transform themselves into capitalists. 
The task here is to identify the conditions under which this happens and when it does 
not. The complicating factor here is that we find many different trajectories of 
capitalist growth, and many others where growth is blocked.  
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At the most general level, we can say that the emergence of a high-growth version of 
a capitalist economy emerges when the factional structure in control of the state and 
state policies (primarily those determining types of rent creation and rent 
management) are compatible with  
a) the emergence of a class of asset holders who own sufficient assets to undertake 
viable capitalist production and  
b) this class faces institutional and market compulsions for rapid technological 
upgrading.  
 
However, the problem is that we can identify a number of different trajectories of 
transformation, some more dynamic than others, and each trajectory has conditions of 
success and failure.  
 
The table on the following page summarizes some of the results of our case study 
analyses. Here I will focus on the comparison of South Korea and India offered by 
Chibber and show how our analysis differs from the emphasis on the contrast between 
export-led growth and import substitution that Chibber focuses on to explain why the 
disciplining of capitalists was more difficult in India. In Chibber’s argument, South 
Korean capitalists who were engaged in export promotion conceded power to the state 
to discipline them because they saw the collective benefit of productivity growth 
which was required (because of interdependence) for their individual survival. In 
contrast, in import substituting India, capitalists did not concede power because 
productivity growth was not necessary.  
 
This argument is not convincing because for the individual capitalist, the collective 
good is not a sufficient argument to give up resistance if the state tries to withdraw 
their subsidies. Clearly, in South Korea, they did not have the political capacity to 
resist, while in India, individual capitalists did have such a political capacity. To 
understand why, we have to look at the details of factional and colonial history. While 
Chibber is right to criticize Kohli for saying that Japanese colonialism did not just set 
the groove into which South Korean development fell, because this undermines the 
role of the South Korean state.  
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Instead, we would argue that Japanese colonialism created the political conditions, 
which, when appropriate state policies emerged, proved to be critical. They allowed 
the emergence of a compatible set of institutions and political power for the rapid 
creation of a structure of capitalist property rights and institutions of compulsion that 
ensured the rapid movement of capitalist enterprises up the productivity ladder. Thus, 
our focus is not on the state in itself, and here we agree with Chibber, but we disagree 
with Chibber on the modelling of the state-society relationship that explains why 
capitalists proved much more difficult to discipline in India compared to South Korea. 
In India, and Pakistan, capitalists could form alliances with many competing patron-
client factions the could each protect their rents for a low price, but in South Korea, 
these factions were absent or very weak and no such protection could be purchased by 
capitalists facing discipline from institutions of compulsion.  
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Redistributive 
Conflicts/ 
Redistributive Rents
Primitive 
Accumulation/ 
Capitalist Rights
Developmental 
Institutions
Transformation 
Outcomes
Malaysia 
1980s 1990s
Powerful intermediate 
classes but centrally 
organized.
Centralized transfers.
Rapid emergence of 
very large capitalists 
backed by the state
Industrial Policy: 
Targeted Learning 
Rents.
Rapid growth and 
capitalist 
transformation.
South Korea
1960s
Limited political 
power of 
redistributive 
coalitions.
Limited redistributive 
rents.
Small capitalists 
taxed and MNCs 
protected.
Capitalists cannot 
buy protection
Public sector and 
MNC-led technology 
acquisition
Rapid growth and 
capitalist 
transformation.
Indian subcontinent 
1980s 1990s
Powerful and 
fragmented 
intermediate classes.
Many redistributive 
rents but still many 
dissatisfied factions.
Redistribution too 
broad-based for 
significant capitalist 
primitive 
accumulation.
Industrial Policy: 
Targeted learning 
rents but capitalists 
can buy protection by 
sharing rents with 
political factions.
Many infant 
industries fail to grow 
up.
Moderate growth and 
slow pace of 
transformation.
Indian subcontinent 
1960s 1970s
Powerful and 
fragmented 
intermediate classes.
Growing political 
fragmentation.
Primitive 
accumulation still 
slow and property 
rights of many small 
capitalists contested 
by mafias.
Liberalization and 
slow withdrawal of 
subsidies for learning.
Growth led by niche 
sectors and 
comparative 
advantage. Higher 
growth than before 
but limited to small-
scale technologies.
Conclusions: i) The state in developing countries is not a policy variable that can be 
chosen by leaders with vision: Amsden, Wade, Chang. Institutions and policies that 
are incompatible with the power structures embedded in patron-client networks can 
do more harm than good. Since power structures differ, institutions that work in one 
country can fail in another. Therefore, my interpretation of the contrast between South 
Asia and North East Asia is more sociological than that of Chibber. The comparison 
with Pakistan is even more instructive than with India because of the similar size of 
the internal market and therefore similar export orientation strategies. 
ii) Equally, the patron-client networks have more degrees of freedom than the class 
structure, and since political organization can change the operation of patron-client 
networks, the role of the state in accelerating economic development does not have a 
one-to-one relationship with the class structure of a society. This is simply saying that 
the role of the state is not entirely determinate.  
iii) The rapidity of capitalist development in late developers depends on how power 
and institutions interact to assist the transformation of property rights in ways that are 
compatible with capitalist production, but also in assisting technology acquisition 
strategies and maintaining political stability. These are not goals that an omniscient 
state has, but rather outcomes often unintended of the play between different factions 
trying to enrich themselves. The example of South Korea has dominated the 
discussion of the state too much in development circles, leading to the discussion of 
state autonomy, insulation and so on, which assumes that the state has some Hegelian 
tasks that society can block it from achieving. In South Korea it is true that a small 
clique was in control of the state, but it was not necessarily any more farsighted or 
less selfishly motivated than cliques in other countries. If we look at South East Asia, 
and in particular at Thailand, we can see more clearly how the balance of power 
between self-seeking and shortsighted factions can nevertheless also result in rapid 
accumulation strategies of a very different type from that of North East Asia.  
iv) The research agenda that this approach opens up is twofold> We need better 
economic theories of rent management and the implications of different patterns of 
transfers for accelerating capitalist growth in late developers. This involves more 
progress in quantifying rents and categorizing  rent management strategies. We also 
need to work on different types of patron-client networks, their processes of change 
and how they constrain or allow different strategies of capitalist development in early 
developers.  
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